Tiger is a cryptographic hash function proposed by Anderson and Biham in 1996 and produces a 192-bit hash value. Recently, weaknesses have been shown in round-reduced variants of the Tiger hash function. Collision attacks have been presented for Tiger reduced to 16 and 19 (out of 24) rounds at FSE 2006 and Indocrypt 2006. Furthermore, Mendel and Rijmen presented a 1-bit pseudo-near-collision for the full Tiger hash function at ASIACRYPT 2007. The attack has a complexity of about 2 47 compression function evaluations. While there exist several collision-style attacks for Tiger, the picture is different for preimage attacks. At WEWoRC 2007, Indesteege and Preneel presented a preimage attack on Tiger reduced to 12 and 13 rounds with a complexity of 2 64.5 and 2 128.5 , respectively. In this article, we show a preimage attack on Tiger with two passes (16 rounds) with a complexity of about 2 174 compression function evaluations. Furthermore, we show how the attack can be extended to 17 rounds with a complexity of about 2 185 . Even though the attacks are only slightly faster than brute force search, they present a step forward in the cryptanalysis of Tiger.
Introduction
A cryptographic hash function H maps a message M of arbitrary length to a fixed-length hash value h. A cryptographic hash function has to fulfill the following security requirements: The resistance of a hash function to collision and (second) preimage attacks depends in the first place on the length n of the hash value. Regardless of how a hash function is designed, an adversary will always be able to find preimages or second preimages after trying out about 2 n different messages. Finding collisions requires a much smaller number of trials: about 2 n/2 due to the birthday paradox. A function is said to achieve ideal security if these bounds are guaranteed.
Tiger is a cryptographic iterated hash function that processes 512-bit blocks and produces a 192-bit hash value. It was proposed by Anderson and Biham in 1996. Recent cryptanalytic results on the hash function Tiger mainly focus on collision attacks. At FSE 2006, Kelsey and Lucks presented a collision attack on 16 and 17 (out of 24) rounds of Tiger [6] . Both attacks have a complexity of about 2 44 evaluations of the compression function. These results were later improved by Mendel et al. in [9] . They showed that a collision can be found for Tiger reduced to 19 rounds with a complexity of about 2 62 evaluations of the compression function. At Asiacrypt 2007, Mendel and Rijmen presented the first attack on the full Tiger hash function [10] . They showed that a 1-bit pseudo-near-collision for Tiger can be constructed with a complexity of about 2 47 compression function evaluations.
While several results have been published regarding the collision-resistance of Tiger, this picture is different for preimage attacks. At WEWoRC 2007, Indesteege and Preneel [4] presented a preimage attack on Tiger reduced to 12 and 13 rounds with a complexity of 2 64.5 and 2 128.5 , respectively.
In this article, we will present a security analysis with respect to preimage resistance for the hash function Tiger. We show a preimage attack on Tiger reduced to 2 passes (16 rounds). It has a complexity of about 2 174 compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2 39 . Very recently Isobe and Shibutani presented a preimage attack on 2 passes of Tiger with complexity of about 2 161 and memory requirements of 2 32 [5] . This is slightly more efficient than the attack presented in this paper. However, their attack method seems to be limited to 2 passes, while our attack can be extended to 17 rounds. In detail, we show how the attack can be extended to 17 rounds with a complexity of about 2 185 and memory requirements of 2 160 In the preimage attack on Tiger, we combine weaknesses in the key schedule of Tiger with a generic meet-in-the-middle approach to construct a preimage for the compression function faster than brute force search. A similar attack strategy was use to construct preimages for the compression function of round-reduced MD5 in [2, 12] . Once we have found a preimage for the compression function of round-reduced Tiger, we use a meet-in-the-middle attack respectively a tree based approach, to turn it into a preimage attack for the hash function.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. A description of the Tiger hash function is given in Section 2. In Section 3, we present preimages for the compression function of Tiger reduced to 16 rounds (2 passes) and 17 rounds. We show how to extend these attacks for the compression function to the hash function in Section 4. Finally, we present conclusions in Section 5.
Description of the Hash Function Tiger
Tiger is an iterated hash function based on the Merkle-Damgård construction. It processes 512-bit input message blocks, maintains a 192-bit state and produces a 192-bit hash value. In the following, we briefly describe the hash function. It basically consists of two parts: the key schedule and the state update trans-formation. A detailed description of the hash function is given in [1] . For the remainder of this article, we will follow the notation given in Table 1 . 
State Update Transformation
The state update transformation of Tiger starts from a (fixed) initial value IV of three 64-bit words and updates them in three passes of eight rounds each. In each round one 64-bit word X introduced by the key schedule is used to update the three state variables A, B and C as follows:
The results are then shifted such that A, B, C will be B, C, A in the next iteration. Fig. 1 shows one round of the state update transformation of Tiger. The non-linear functions even and odd used in each round are defined as follows:
where state variable C is split into eight bytes c 7 , . . . , c 0 with c 7 is the most significant byte and c 0 is the least significant byte. Four S-boxes T 1 , . . . , T 4 : {0, 1} 8 → {0, 1} 64 are used to compute the output of the non-linear functions even and odd. For the definition of the S-boxes we refer to [1] . Note that state variable B is multiplied with the constant mult ∈ {5, 7, 9} at the end of each round. The value of the constant is different in each pass of the Tiger hash function. Fig. 1 . The round function of Tiger.
After the last round of the state update transformation, the initial values A −1 , B −1 , C −1 and the output values of the last round A 23 , B 23 , C 23 are combined, resulting in the final value of one iteration (feed forward). The result is the final hash value or the initial value for the next message block.
Key Schedule
The key schedule takes a 512-bit message block X 0 , . . . , X 7 and produces 24 64bit words X 0 , . . . , X 23 . It is an invertible function which ensures that changing a small number of bits in the message will affect a lot of bits in the next pass. While the message words X 0 , . . . , X 7 are used in the first pass to update the state variables, the remaining 16 message words, 8 for the second pass and 8 for the third pass, are generated by applying the key schedule as follows:
The key schedule modifies the inputs (I 0 , . . . , I 7 ) in two steps:
The final values (O 0 , . . . , O 7 ) are the output of the key schedule.
Preimage Attacks on the Compression Function
In this section, we will present two preimage attacks on the compression function of Tiger -one for Tiger with 2 passes (16 rounds) and one for 17 rounds. Both attacks are based on structural weaknesses in the key schedule of Tiger. By combining these weaknesses with a generic meet-in-the-middle approach we can construct a preimage for the compression function of Tiger reduced to 16 rounds (2 passes) with a complexity of about 2 173 compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2 38 . The attack can be extended to 17 rounds of Tiger at the cost of about 2 184 compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2 159 . In the following, we will describe both attacks in more detail.
Preimage Attack on Two Passes of Tiger
Before describing the preimage attack on the compression function of Tiger reduced to 2 passes (16 rounds), we first have a closer look at the key schedule of Tiger. In the following, we present a differential characteristic for the key schedule of Tiger which we can use to construct preimages for the compression function faster than brute force search. Consider the differential
with δ 1 δ 2 = 0, where δ 1 and δ 2 denote modular differences in the 19 most significant bits of the message words X 0 , X 2 and X 8 . In order to guarantee that this characteristic holds in the key schedule of Tiger, several conditions have to be fulfilled. Due to the design of the key schedule of Tiger, the difference δ 1 in X 0 will lead to the same difference δ 1 in T 0 = X 0 (X 7 ⊕ A5A5A5A5A5A5A5A5). Furthermore, by choosing X 1 = 0, we get T 1 = T 0 and hence ∆T 1 = ∆T 0 = δ 1 . Since ∆T 1 = δ 1 , ∆X 2 = δ 2 and δ 1 δ 2 = 0, there will be no difference in T 2 = X 2 T 1 . Note that by restricting the choice of δ 1 and hence δ 2 to differences in the 19 most significant bits we can ensure that there will be no differences in
). It is easy to see, that due to the left shift of T 1 by 19 bits these differences will be canceled. Since there are no difference in T 2 and T 3 , there will be no differences in T 4 , . . . , T 7 . To ensure that there will be only a difference in X 8 = T 0 T 7 , namely δ 1 after the second step of the key schedule of Tiger, we need that T 7 = 0. This can be achieved by adjusting X 6 accordingly, such that T 6 ⊕ X 7 = 0. It is easy to see that if T 7 = 0 then X 8 = T 0 and hence ∆X 8 = ∆T 0 = δ 1 . Furthermore, X 9 = T 1 X 8 and hence ∆X 9 = δ 1 δ 1 = 0. Since ∆X 9 = 0 and there are no differences in T 2 , . . . , T 7 there will be no differences in X 10 , . . . , X 15 . By fulfilling all these conditions on the message words and restricting the differences of δ 1 and hence δ 2 to the 19 most significant bits, this characteristic for the key schedule of Tiger will always hold.
We will use this characteristic for the key schedule of Tiger to show a preimage attack on Tiger reduced to 16 rounds (2 passes). We combine the characteristic for the key schedule of Tiger with a generic meet-in-the-middle approach, to construct a preimage for the compression function of Tiger with 2 passes. The attack has a complexity of about 2 173 compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2 38 . It can be summarized as follows.
1. Suppose we seek a preimage of h = AA BB CC, then we chose A −1 = AA, B −1 = BB, and C −1 = CC. To guarantee that the output after the feed forward is correct, we need that A 15 = 0, B 15 = 0, and C 15 = 0. 2. In order to guarantee that the characteristic for the key schedule of Tiger holds, we choose random values for the message words X 0 , X 2 , . . . , X 7 and set X 1 = 0. Furthermore, we adjust X 6 accordingly, such that T 7 = 0. 3. Next we compute A 7 , B 7 , and C 7 for all 2 38 choices of B −1 [63 − 45] and C −1 [63 − 45] and save the result in a list L. In other words, we get 2 38 entries in the list L by modifying the 19 most significant bits of B −1 and the 19 most significant bits of C −1 . 4. For all 2 38 choices of the 19 most significant bits of B 15 and the 19 most significant bits of C 15 we compute A 7 , B 7 , C 7 (by going backward) and check if there is an entry in the list L such that the following conditions are fulfilled:
These conditions will hold with probability of 2 −173 . Note that we can always adjust the 19 most significant bits of X 8 such that the 19 most significant bits of C 7 and C 7 match. Since there are 2 38 entries in the list L and we test 2 38 candidates, we expect to find a matching entry with probability of 2 −173 · 2 76 = 2 −97 . Hence, finishing this step of the attack has a complexity of about 2 38 · 2 97 = 2 135 evaluations of the compression function of Tiger and memory requirements of 2 38 . 5. Once we have found a solution, we have to modify the 19 most significant bits of X 0 and X 2 such that the characteristic in the key schedule of Tiger holds. To cancel the differences in X 0 and X 2 , we have to adjust the 19 most significant bits of B −1 and C −1 accordingly. Thus, after applying the feed-forward we get a partial pseudo preimage for 154 (out of 192) bits of the compression function of Tiger reduced to 16 rounds.
Hence, we will find a partial pseudo preimage (154 out of 192 bits) with a complexity of 2 135 and memory requirements of 2 38 . By repeating the attack 2 38 times we will find a preimage for the compression function with a complexity of about 2 173 instead of the expected 2 192 compression function evaluations. Note that the partial pseudo preimage (154 out of 192 bits) is also a fixed-point in 154 bits for the compression function f . We will need this later to turn the attack on the compression function into an attack on the hash function.
Going Beyond Two Passes
In a similar way as we can construct a preimage for the compression function of Tiger reduced to 16 rounds, we can also construct a preimage for the compression function of Tiger reduced to 17 rounds. The attack has a complexity of about 2 184 compression function evaluations and has memory requirements of 2 159 . For the attack on 17 rounds we use a slightly different characteristic for the key schedule of Tiger. It is shown below.
(0, δ 1 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, δ 2 ) → (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, δ 3 ) → (δ 4 , ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
where δ 4 denotes modular difference in the 31 most significant bits of the message word X 16 and δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 denote modular difference in the 8 most significant bits of the message words X 1 , X 7 , X 15 . Note that while in the attack on 2 passes we have only differences in the 19 most significant bits, we have now differences in the 8 (respectively 31) most significant bits of the message words.
In order to guarantee that this characteristic holds in the key schedule of Tiger, several conditions have to be fulfilled. In detail, a difference δ 2 in X 7 will lead to a difference in T 0 = X 0 (X 7 ⊕ A5A5A5A5A5A5A5A5) after the first step of the key schedule. By adjusting X 1 accordingly (choosing the difference δ 1 carefully), we can prevent that the difference in T 0 propagates to T 1 = X 1 ⊕ T 0 and hence, there will be no differences in T 1 , . . . , T 6 . However, due to the design of the key schedule of Tiger there will be a difference in T 7 = X 7 ⊕ T 6 . In order to prevent the propagation of the differences in T 7 to X 8 we need that T 6 = A5A5A5A5A5A5A5A5. Thus, we have that
We can guarantee that T 6 = A5A5A5A5A5A5A5A5 by adjusting X 6 accordingly. Note that by restricting the differences of δ 2 and hence also δ 1 to the 8 most significant there will be only differences in the 8 most significant bits of T 7 = X 7 ⊕ T 6 and therefore no differences in X 9 = T 1 (X 8 ⊕ ((¬T 7 ) 19)) and X 10 , . . . , X 14 , only in X 15 = T 7 (X 14 ⊕ 0123456789ABCDEF) there will be a difference δ 3 in the 8 most significant bits.
However, in the third pass there will be differences in the 31 most significant bits of X 16 (denoted by δ 4 ) due to the design of the key schedule of Tiger. It is easy to see that a difference in the 8 most significant bits in X 15 will result in differences in the 8 most significant bits of T 0 , . . . , T 5 . Furthermore, since T 6 = X 14 (T 5 ⊕ ¬T 4 23) we will get differences in the 31 most significant bits of T 6 and hence also in T 7 as well as in X 16 = T 0 T 7 .
Again, by combining this characteristic for the key schedule of Tiger with a generic meet-in-the-middle approach, we can construct preimages for the compression function of Tiger for more than 2 passes (17 rounds) with a complexity of about 2 184 compression function evaluations. The attack can be summarized as follows.
1. Suppose we seek a preimage of h = AA BB CC, then we chose A −1 = AA, B −1 = BB, and C −1 = CC. To guarantee that the output after the feed forward is correct, we need that A 16 = 0, B 16 = 0, and C 16 = 0. 2. Choose random values for the message words X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X 7 such that T 6 = A5A5A5A5A5A5A5A5 after the first step of the key schedule of Tiger. Note that this can be easily done by adjusting X 6 accordingly, i.e. X 6 = T 6 (T 5 ⊕ (¬T 4 23)). This is needed to ensure that differences in T 7 will be canceled in the key schedule -leading to the correct value of X 8 after the second step of the key schedule. 3. Next we compute A 6 , B 6 , C 6 for all 2 159 choices of A −1 , C −1 and B −1 [63-
− 33] and save the result in a list L. In other words, we get 2 159 entries in the list L by modifying A −1 , C −1 and the 31 most significant bits of B −1 . 4. For all 2 159 choices of A 16 , C 16 and the 31 most significant bits of B 16 we compute A 6 , B 6 , C 6 (by going backward) and check if there is an entry in the list L such that the following conditions are fulfilled:
These conditions will hold with probability of 2 −184 . Note that we can always adjust the 8 most significant bits of X 7 such that C 6 = C 6 will match. Since there are 2 159 entries in the list L and we test 2 159 candidates, we will find 2 −184 · 2 318 = 2 134 solutions. In other words, we get 2 134 solutions with a complexity of about 2 159 evaluations of the compression function of Tiger and memory requirements of 2 159 . 5. For each solution, we have to modify the 8 most significant bits of X 1 such that T 1 = X 1 ⊕ T 0 is correct in the first step of the key schedule for the new value of X 7 . Note that by ensuring that T 1 is correct, we will get the same values for X 8 , . . . , X 14 after applying the key schedule of Tiger, since T 6 = A5A5A5A5A5A5A5A5 due to step 2 of the attack. In order to cancel the differences in the 8 most significant bits of X 1 , we have to adjust the 8 most significant bits of A −1 accordingly. Furthermore, the 8 most significant bits of X 15 and the 31 most significant bits of X 16 will change as well. This results in new values for A 16 , C 16 and the 31 most significant bits of B 16 . Since, we modify A −1 , C −1 and the 31 most significant bits of B −1 in the attack we get after the feed-forward 2 134 partial pseudo preimage (partial meaning 33 out of 192 bits) for the compression function of Tiger reduced to 17 rounds.
Hence, we will find 2 134 partial pseudo preimage (33 out of 192 bits) with a complexity of 2 159 . By repeating the attack 2 25 times we will find a preimage for the compression function of Tiger reduced to 17 rounds with a complexity of about 2 159 · 2 25 = 2 184 instead of the expected 2 192 compression function evaluations.
Extending the Attacks to the Hash Function
If we want to extend the preimage attack on the compression function of Tiger to the hash function, we encounter two obstacles. In contrast to an attack on the compression function, where the chaining value (or initial value) can be chosen freely, the initial value IV is fixed for the hash function. In other words, for a preimage attack on the hash function we have to find a message m such that H(IV, m) = h. Furthermore, we have to ensure that the padding of the message leading to the preimage of h is correct. First, we choose the message length such that only a single bit of padding will be set in X 6 of the last message block. The last bit of X 6 has to be 1 as specified by the padding rule. Since we use in both attacks characteristics for the key schedule of Tiger where no difference appears in X 6 , we can easily guarantee that the last bit of X 6 is 1. However, X 7 of the last message block will contain the message length as a 64-bit integer. While we can choose X 7 free in the attack on 2 passes (16 rounds), this is not the case for the attack on 17 rounds. The 8 most significant bits of X 7 are determined during the attack (cf. Section 3.2). However, the remaining bits of X 7 can be chosen freely. Therefore, we can always guarantee that we will have a message length such that the padding of the last block is correct. For the sake of simplicity let us assume for the following discussion that the message (after padding) consists of + 1 message blocks.
We show how to construct a preimage for Tiger reduced to 16 rounds consisting of + 1 message blocks, i.e. m = M 1 M 2 · · · M +1 . Note that the attack for Tiger reduced to 17 rounds works similar. It can be summarized as follows.
1. First, we invert the last iteration of the compression function f (H , M +1 ) = h to get H and M +1 . Note that this determines the length of our preimage. This step of the attack has a complexity of about 2 173 compression function evaluations. 2. Once we have fixed the last message block M +1 and hence the length of the message m, we have to find a message m * = M 1 M 2 · · · M consisting of message blocks such that H(IV, m * M +1 ) = h. This can be done once more by using a meet-in-the-middle approach.
(a) Use the preimage attack on the compression function to generate 2 10 pairs (H j −1 , M j ) leading to the chaining value H and save them in a list L. This has a complexity of about 2 10 · 2 173 = 2 183 compression function evaluations. (b) Compute H −1 by choosing random values for the message blocks M i for 1 ≤ i < and check for a match in L. After testing about 2 182 candidates, we expect to find a match in the list L. Once, we have found a matching entry, we have found a preimage for the hash function Tiger reduced to 16 rounds consisting of + 1 message blocks.
Hence, we can construct a preimage for the Tiger hash function reduced to 16 rounds with a complexity of about 2 183 compression function evaluations. In a similar way we can find a preimage for Tiger reduced to 17 rounds with a complexity of about 2 188 .
However, due to the special structure of the partial-pseudo-preimages for the compression function of Tiger reduced to 16 and 17 rounds, this complexity can be reduced by using a tree-based approach. This was first used by Mendel and Rijmen in the cryptanalysis of HAS-V [11] . Later variants and extensions of this method were presented in [3, 7, 8] . With this method, we can construct a preimage for the Tiger hash function reduced to 16 and 17 rounds with a complexity of about 2 174 and 2 185 compression function evaluations, respectively. In the following, we will describe this in more detail for Tiger reduced to 16 rounds. Note that the attack for Tiger reduced to 17 rounds works similar.
1. Assume we want to construct a preimage for Tiger reduced to 16 rounds consisting of + 1 message blocks. 2. First, compute H and M +1 by inverting the last iteration of the compression function. Note that this determines the length of our preimage m. This step of the attack has a complexity of about 2 173 compression function evaluations. 3. Next, we construct a list L containing 2 39 partial-pseudo-preimages for the compression function of Tiger. Note that all partial-pseudo-preimages will have the following form:
and hw(mask) = 154, where hw(x) denotes the bit Hamming weight of x.
In other words, each preimage for the compression function is also a fixedpoint for 192 − 38 = 154 bits. Note that this is important for the attack to work. Constructing the list L has a complexity of about 2 39 · 2 135 = 2 174 compression function evaluations. 4. Next, by using the entries in the list L we build a backward tree starting from H . For each node in the tree we expect to get two new nodes on the next level. It is easy to see that since we have 2 39 entries in the list L, where 154 bits are equal for each entry, we will always have two entries, where H i is equal. Therefore, we will have about 2 20 nodes at level 20. In other words, we have about 2 20 candidates for H −20 . 5. To find a message consisting of − 20 message blocks leading to one of the 2 20 candidates for H −20 we use a meet-in-the-middle approach. First, we choose an arbitrary message (of −21 message blocks) leading to some H −21 . Second, we have to find a message block M −20 such that f (H −21 , M −20 ) = H −20 for one of the 2 20 candidates for H −20 in the list L. After testing about 2 172 message blocks M −20 we expect to find a matching entry in the tree and hence, a preimage for Tiger reduced to 16 rounds. Thus, this step of the attack has a complexity of about 2 172 compression function evaluations of Tiger.
Hence, with this method we can find a preimage for the Tiger hash function reduced to 16 rounds with a complexity of about 2 174 compression function evaluations and memory requirement of 2 39 . Note that the same method can be used to construct preimages for the Tiger hash function reduced to 17 rounds with a complexity of about 2 185 compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2 160 .
Conclusion
In this article, we presented a preimage attack on the compression function of Tiger reduced to 16 and 17 rounds with a complexity of about 2 173 and 2 184 compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2 38 and 2 159 , respectively. In the attack, we combined weaknesses in the key schedule of Tiger with a generic meet-in-the-middle approach. Furthermore, we used a tree-based approach to extend the attacks for the compression function to the hash function with a complexity of about 2 174 and 2 185 compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2 39 and 2 160 , respectively. Even though the complexities of the presented attacks are only slightly faster than brute force search, they show that the security margins of the Tiger hash function with respect to preimage attacks are not as good as expected.
